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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, et al., 
Def end ants, 
* * * * 
OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS & 
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, a corporation, RICHARD 
P. GARRICK, BOISE CASCADE 
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY 
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation, 
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10516 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants respectfully petition this Court for a 
rehearing in this matter on the grounds that the Court 
erred in its opinion filed on February 27, 1967, and as 
reasons for such requested rehearing submit the follow• 
ing brief. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Following are the facts essential to the questions 
raised by this petition for rehearing: 
The respondent, Western Mortgage Loan Corpora-
tion, and Cottonwood Construction Company entered 
into a loan transaction for the purpose of building a 
house on the lot in question. The agreement consisted 
of several documents. In addition to a conventional note 
and mortgage, these related documents embodying the 
agreement of the parties included a "Building and Loan 
Agreement and Assignment of Account" and another 
document entitled "Release, Indemnity and Schedule A." 
The "Release, Indemnity and Schedule A" provided 
"that such disbursement of funds arc to be made wholly 
within the discretion of the'' lender, and included an-
other provision that changes "as to amounts and time 
of disbursements may be made at any time by the [lend-
er] as it may, in its sole discretion, determine." 
The "Building and Loan Agreement and Assign-
ment Account" included a provision in paragraph 10 
thereof which upon specified default of the borrower 
empowered the lender at its option to be released from 
all obligations under the agreement, and allowed it, again 
at its option, to take over the project, complete it and 
charge to the borrower the funds so expended. 
Part way through the building of the house the bor-
rower defaulted while still owing the lienor-appellants 
for materials furnished for the house. The lender elected 
to complete the house, did so, charged its expenditures 
to the borrower and brought this foreclosure suit. 
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This Court granted interlocutory appeal from pre-
trial rulings of the trial court to the effect that the con-
struction financing transaction provided for obligaory 
advances and that certain work constituted the "com-
mencement to do work ... " within the meaning of the 
mechanics' lien law. 
By its opinion filed February 27, 1967, this Court 
upheld the rulings of the trial court, basing its decision 
in material part upon the view that the construction 
loan agreement here was the same as the agreement in 
Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 
2d 335, 336 P. 2d 598 ( 1961), and upon language in 
the mortgage providing that the mortgage "shall also 
secure additional loans hereafter made .... " 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS 
There are significant differences between the agree-
ment in the instant case and Utah Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Mecham, differences which render the two 
cases exactly opposite, differences apparently not ade-
quately called to the Court's attention in the first in-
stance. 
In addition, appellants respectfully submit that the 
Court's reliance upon the "shall also secure additional 
loans hereafter made . . . . " provision induced error be-
cause that particular provision is not pertinent to the 
issues on appeal, and was not raised by or relied upon 
by either appellants or respondents. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION V. 
MECHAM IS NOT CONTROLLING FOR THE 
REASON THAT IN THAT CASE THE OPERA-
TIVE DOCUMENTS DID NOT INCLUDE A PRO-
VISION RENDERING THE ADVANCES VOLI-
TIONAL OR NON-OBLIGATORY WHEREAS IN 
THE INSTANT CASE THE OPERATIVE DOCU-
MENTS DO CONTAIN SUCH PROVISIONS. 
The transaction in the instant case is not similar to 
the transaction in Utah Savings & Loan Association v. 
Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P. 2d 598 (1961), for 
there, according to the opinion and the briefs, there 
were but a conventional note and mortgage to show the ' 
entire agreements of the parties. On these facts this 
Court found an implied obligation to make advances up 
to the amount of the note. 
In the instant case there are express terms of the 
agreement between the parties which negative any such 
implied obligation. These terms, possibly inadventently 
overlooked by the majority opinion, are contained in the 
"Release, Indemnity and Schedule A" document and in 
Paragraph 10 of the "Construction Loan Agreement and 
Assignment of Account" document, all of which are in-
tegral parts of the loan agreement. (R. 151, Exhibits 
W-2; Exhibits G and H to the Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal.) 
The complexity, factual and legal, of this case and 
the large amount of small print involved may have ob-
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scured the above provisions which are the ones which 
form the issues involved in paragraph 1 of the trial courts 
pretrial order. 
The significant difference between the two cases is 
noted in the dissenting opinion and is patent upon care-
ful examination of the briefs and opinion in Utah Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Mecham, supra. 
In view of the language in the instant loan docu-
ments rendering wholly discretionary with the lender the 
piecemeal advances of funds purportedly already loaned, 
the anomolous result of the opinion appears to be that 
even obviously optional loan agreements are, now by law, 
obligatory in Utah. 
This result is contrary to the rule universally applied 
to such agreements by the courts See e.g., W. P. Fuller & 
Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 2d 185, 191 Pac. 1027 
(1920); Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 47 Atl. 327 
( 1900) and additional authorities cited at page 12 of 
appellants' initial brief. 
Clearly such a holding will serve unjustly to deprive 
materialmen and laborers of the benefits of the mechanics' 
lien statute intended to protect them from the combined 
economic advantage of the lender and the borrower. 
POINT II. 
RELIANCE UPON THE PROVISION IN THE 
MORTGAGE THAT IT SHALL ALSO SECURE 
ADDITIONAL LOANS THEREAFTER MADE 
CAUSED THE COURT TO ARRIVE AT A WRONG 
RESULT AND IS ERROR BECAUSE THAT PRO-
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VISION IS NOT PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES 
ON APPEAL AND WAS NOT RAISED OR RELIED 
UPON BY EITHER APPELLANTS OR RESPOND-
ENTS. 
The majority opinion states that the appellants rely 
upon certain langauge in the mortgage concerning loans 
in the future, sometimes loosely referred to as "future 
advances." The fact that this expression, "future ad-
vances," may have been used by the parties to describe 
varying situations may have unintentionally led the court 
to the conclusion that appellants were relying upon the 
cited provision. 
In point of fact, however, neither appellants nor 
respondents relied upon this provision below, or raised 
it on appeal or argued it. The reason is that it is not 
pertinent to the issues raised on appeal. 
Nor is there any argument that the lender made 
such "additional loans." 
What appellants do contend is that the provisions 
in the "Release, Indemnity and Schedule A" document 
make the agreement volitional or non-obligatory as to 
advances before default and that the terms of paragraph 
10 of the "Building and Loan Agreement and Assign-
ment of Account" document (both of which are integral 
parts of the loan transaction) make, in any event, the 
advances admittedly voluntarily incurred by the lender 
after default volitional or non-obligatory with the result 
that such volitional advances take priority only as of the 
time of each such advance. W. P. Fuller & Co., v. 
McClure, supra. 
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Using this "additional loans hereafter made" pro-
vision to justify holding admittedly volitional expendi-
tures obligatory is erroneous on the facts of the instant 
case and interjects into the law an undesirable twist. 
Under the present opinion, regardless of the amounts 
involved so long as they do not exceed the face of the 
note, and even though there clearly is no obligation to 
make advances, such advances will be held to be obliga-
tory and thus prior to the rightful liens of materiahnen 
and laborers who have by substance and labor improved 
the land of others. 
The present opinion gives construction lenders the 
best of both possible worlds. As written, such lenders are 
in Utah, without being obliged to make future advances, 
afforded priority over intervening liens as though they 
were so obliged. Appellants respectfully submit that -
in an economy in which state lines do not constitute a 
barrier to the flow of commerce and the trend is all in 
the direction of uniform commercial laws - Utah should 
not thus break with the optional - obligatory rule which 
elsewhere prevails. This is especially true as regards dis-
cretionary advancements before default. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, appellants respectfully 
pray that this Court grant a rehearing in order that this 
Court may reconsider its opinion herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
By Ray G. Martineau 
C. Keith Rooker 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that in my judgment the 
foregoing petition for rehearing is well founded 
and that it is not interposed for delay. 
